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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY
THE POLICE
"The question is ... whether deadly force could constitutionally
be used to effect the arrest of this fleeing eighteen-year-old burglar who
threatened no one's life during the commission of the burglary and
posed no threat to the apprehending officers or others."' Such a ques-
tion, as framed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, has been asked with increasing frequency throughout the coun-
try.
Each year numerous incidents similar to that which forms the
background for the Eighth Circuit's question occur in the cities of this
country.2 A person, often a teenager, commits a felony-most often a
crime against property, such as burglary-and attempts to escape. 3 Al-
though he threatens no one's life during the commission of the crime
nor during his attempt to flee from police officers, he is shot and killed
by such officers, who act under the authority of applicable state law.
This scenario is so often repeated because only a minority of states
have imposed statutory restrictions on a police officer's use of deadly
force4 to apprehend a fleeing felon even though the felon himself does
not use or threaten to use deadly force against either the officer or any
other citizen during the commission of the felony or during the attempt
to escape arrest. 5
When the Eighth Circuit, in Mattis v. Schnarr,6 declared unconsti-
tutional two Missouri statutes allowing the use of deadly force by the
police in such situations, its decision, in theory, cast doubt on the con-
1. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per curiam sub
nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
2. See, e.g., C. MILTON, J. HALLECK, J. LARDNER & G. ALBRECHT, POLICE USE OF DEADLY
FORCE 33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as POLICE FOUNDATION] for a table reporting the number of
civilians killed by the police throughout the nation from 1960 to 1975.
3. In the case decided by the Eighth Circuit, for example, an eighteen-year-old boy, with a
seventeen-year-old companion, broke into the unoccupied office of a golf driving range at night in
order to take money. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per curiam
sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
4. For the purpose of this note, the term "deadly force" is used as defined in the Model
Penal Code:
'[D]eadly force' means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which
he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Purposely
firing a firearm in the direction of another person or at a vehicle in which another person
is believed to be constitutes deadly force.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
5. See notes 27, 28, and 35 infra and the accompanying text for those states that have statu-
torily restricted the use of deadly force beyond the common law rule.
6. 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per curiam sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis,
431 U.S. 171 (1977).
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stitutionality of laws in at least twenty-nine other states. 7 However,
barely two months after the Mattis decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, in Wiley v. Memphis Police Department,8 rejected the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning and upheld the constitutionality of a Ten-
nessee statute with provisions similar to those at issue in Mattis. Few
other courts have been directly confronted with the question of the con-
stitutionality of such state statutes, which essentially embody the com-
mon law rule.9 Those few challenges which have been brought have
generally alleged a violation of the right to equal protection of the
laws,' 0 a denial of due process," or the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment.' 2 Yet the Eighth Circuit stands alone in holding that a
state statute authorizing the use of deadly force by the police in at-
tempting to arrest any fleeing felon is indeed unconstitutional. The is-
sue of the validity of such statutes remains unresolved at this time, for
the Supreme Court of the United States vacated the Eighth Circuit's
decision on grounds unrelated to the merits of the case,' 3 and, subse-
quently, the Court denied certiorari on the Sixth Circuit's decision.' 4
This note will first inspect the various current statutory approaches
to the issue throughout the country as well as the Model Penal Code' 5
approach. The policies of several law enforcement agencies and the
recommendations of certain studies will also be discussed. The note
will then describe the relevant case law and will analyze the various
constitutional arguments which may be used to strike down deadly
force statutes in light of the treatment which the courts have afforded
such arguments in past decisions. Finally, the note will conclude that
the constitutional requirements of at least the eighth' 6 and fourteenth
7. See notes 25, 27, and 28 infra.
8. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
9. See the discussion of the applicable case law in the text accompanying notes 59-142 infra.
Some courts have only ruled on the common law defense of an officer acting on his reasonable
good faith belief that such a use of deadly force was necessary. See, e.g., Martyn v. Donlin, 151
Conn. 402, 198 A.2d 700 (1964). The plaintiff in such cases has generally brought his action as a
state tort claim for wrongful death or in a suit in federal court for deprivation of civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § I provides in pertinent part:
[Nior shall any State. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
I1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
[Nior shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I states:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
13. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (per curiam).
14. Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
15. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
16. See note 12 supra.
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amendments,'7 in conjunction with enlightened public policy consider-
ations, demand that such statutes be found unconstitutional.
CURRENT STATUTORY APPROACHES
At common law, the use of deadly force was authorized if it was
necessary in order to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing felon but not of a
fleeing misdemeanant. 18 The justification for such a distinction rested
largely on the fact that all early common law felonies involved force or
violence19 and were punishable by death.20 Therefore, it was reasoned,
killing a felony suspect in the course of attempting to arrest him, with-
out affording him the procedures of a fair trial, merely imposed the
certain consequences of his conduct immediately, rather than at a later
date.2'
All jurisdictions in the United States have adopted the common
law rule in regard to fleeing misdemeanants.2 2 But today, since few
crimes are punishable by death and since all jurisdictions have ex-
panded the class of common law felonies to include many crimes not
involving force or violence, 23 the given justification for the common
law rule in regard to fleeing felons no longer has relevance. Neverthe-
less, the majority of jurisdictions still basically adhere to the traditional
doctrine. 24 Thus, twenty states2 5 have codified and still enforce the
17. See notes 10 and II supra.
18. 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, §§ 532, 534 (12th ed. 1932). See, e.g., United States v.
Clark, 31 F. 710, 713 (8th Cir. 1887) (dictum); People v. Klein, 305 111. 141, 137 N.E. 145 (1922);
State v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 103 N.W. 944 (1905); State v. Dietz, 59 Kan. 576, 53 P. 870 (1898);
Hill v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879).
19. Arson, burglary, manslaughter, murder, rape, and robbery were the crimes recognized as
felonies.
20. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, Comment 3 at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
21. See Tsimbinos, The Justied Use of Deadly Force, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, 17 (1968)'[herein-
after cited as Tsimbinos]; Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest.- Triggering Constitutional Review, II
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 361, 364-65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Deadly Force to
Arrest]. Furthermore, in the early common law a police officer was permitted to use deadly force
only if he knew that the fleeing person had actually committed the felony and not if he merely
reasonably believed that that person had committed the crime. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES 289-90 (4th ed. 1771); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, § 533 (12th ed. 1932).
22. E.g., State v. Wilson, 41 Id. 616, 243 P. 359 (1925); People v. Klein, 305 111. 141, 137 N.E.
145 (1922); State v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 103 N.W. 944 (1905); State v. Dietz, 59 Kan. 576, 53 P.
870 (1898); Hill v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931); Brown v. Weaver, 76 Miss.
7, 23 So. 388 (1898); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879).
23. See Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. It should also be noted that seven states have no relevant statutes at all (Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming), while five states have statutes
that deal with the use of deadly force in preventing the commission of a crime but not in appre-
hending the criminal (Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 26-902 (1978); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:20(2) (West 1974); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 113-6 (West 1969); South Carolina:
S.C. CODE § 17-13-20 (1976); and Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2305 (1974)).
25. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.090 (1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-510(2)(a) (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 196 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-22(c)(2) (West 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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common law rule that deadly force may be used by a police officer in
order to apprehend any fleeing felony suspect. 26
Other states have placed varying restrictions on the common law
approach. An Arizona statute, for example, modifies the common law
rule by prohibiting the use of deadly force against felons who flee from
justice or resist arrest without using physical force.27 Eight other
states, 28 following the lead of Illinois in 1961,29 have substantially re-
§ 776.05 (West 1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-4011 (1947); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-3(b) (Burns
Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3215(1) (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.065(3) (1964); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 544.190, 559.040 (Vernon 1969): NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.140(3)(b) (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:5(11)(b)(1) (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A-2-7 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 732 (West 1951); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-9 (1969);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-32 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808 (1975); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A. 16.040(3) (1977); Wis. STAT. § 939.45(4) (1973). Although the California
Penal Code deadly force statute is apparently only a codification of the common law rule, the
California state courts have given the statute a much more restrictive interpretation:
Thus it appears . . . that the applicable sections of the California Penal Code, as con-
strued by the courts of this state, prohibit the use of deadly force by anyone, including a
police officer, against a fleeing felony suspect unless the felony is of the violent variety,
i.e., a forcible and atrocious one which threatens death or serious bodily harm, or there
are other circumstances which reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm
to the officer or to another.
Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 333, 138 Cal. Rptr. 26, 30-31 (1977). See also Long Beach
Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 373-75, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348, 353-54
(1976).
26. The current Indiana statute, which went into effect July 1, 1977, and the statute which
immediately preceded it illustrate the two basic forms of such a statute:
If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly
resist, the officer may use all necessary means to effect the arrest.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-19-3 (Burns Supp. 1976) (in effect prior to July 1, 1977).
A law-enforcement officer is justified in using force if he reasonably believes that the
force is necessary to effect a lawful arrest. However, an officer is justified in using deadly
force only if he reasonably believes that that force is necessary: (1) To prevent serious
bodily injury to himself or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony; or (2)
To effect an arrest of a person who has committed or attempted to commit a felony.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-3(b) (Burns Supp. 1978) (current law).
The Tennessee statute at issue in the Sixth Circuit's decision in Wiley was such a common
law codification: "If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly
resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808
(1975). The statute was originally enacted in 1858. As early as 1879, the Tennessee Supreme
Court was suggesting that, in view of the increase in the number of crimes defined as felonies, the
Tennessee legislature should reconsider its rule of law. Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879). Yet
that same Tennessee statute, declared constitutional by the Sixth Circuit in Wiley, continues to
exist in its common law format.
27. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-410 (Spec. Pamphlet 1978). The statute, effective October 1, 1978,
also allows the use of deadly force against a felon escaping from lawful confinement and against
any person "actually resisting the discharge of a legal duty with deadly physical force or with the
apparent capacity to use deadly physical force." Id The statute essentially follows the common
law rule by ignoring the seriousness of the harm to persons which the felon has caused or will
cause.
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467(c) (1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a)(2) (1977);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-3-106(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1977), 95-602(b) (1969); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 35.30(l)(a) (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(d) (1976); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.239 (1977); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 508(a)(l)(ii) (Purdon 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
2-404(2) (Spec. Pamphlet 1977).
29. The Illinois deadly force statute provides in pertinent part:
[A] peace officer. . . is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm
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stricted the common law approach either by justifying the use of deadly
force only in arresting "forcible felony" suspects 30 or by specifically
naming certain felonies for the commission of which deadly force may
be used in effecting an arrest.3' In explaining the rationale for such a
modification, the drafting committee of the Illinois statute stated: "To
authorize the killing of an offender who is not likely to harm anyone if
he successfully resists arrest, simply on the ground that his offense is
designated as a felony instead of as a misdemeanor, seems indefen-
sible." 32
However, the drafters of the Model Penal Code indicated that re-
stricting the use of deadly force to situations in which a certain desig-
nated felony was committed, without any regard to the nature of and
only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great
bodily harm to himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes both that
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or
escape; and (2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony
or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will
endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a) (1977).
30. Delaware, Illinois, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See note 28 supra.
A "forcible felony" is defined in Illinois, for example, as "treason, murder, voluntary manslaugh-
ter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery and any other felony which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 2-8 (1977) (emphasis added). In Pennsylvania, "forcible felony" has not been defined by
the state legislature. Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have not as yet definitively interpreted the
state's deadly force statute. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ward, 415 F. Supp. 976, 978-79 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
It has, therefore, been questioned whether the statute is in reality any more restrictive than the
common law rule. See Comment, Justifiable Use ofDeadly Force in Law Enforcement, 78 DICK.
L. REV. 115, 122 (1973).
The Delaware statute allows the use of deadly force against a fleeing felon who committed a
crime "involving physical injury or threat thereof" only if the officer also believes that "there is a
substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious physical injury, or will
never be captured if his apprehension is delayed." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467(c) (1975).
In Montana, the deadly force statute states that "[aIll necessary and reasonable force may be
used in making an arrest . . " :MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 95-602(b) (1969). Furthermore,
under this statute "[a] peace officer or other person who has an arrested person in his custody is
justified in the use of such force to prevent the escape of the arrested person from custody as he
would be justified in using if he were arresting such person." MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3-
106(l) (Spec. Pamphlet 1977). However, the drafting commission comments regarding section 94-
3-106(1), after noting that the section concerns the use of deadly force to prevent escape and not
the use of force which is justifiable in making the original arrest, includes the following statement:
"If the offense for which the person was arrested was not a forcible felony, but the offender was
armed with a deadly weapon, deadly force might have been used to effect the arrest." MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3-106 at 36 (Spec. Pamphlet 1977). The comment thus implies that the
use of deadly force is restricted to circumstances in which a forcible felony was committed unless a
fleeing felon is armed with a deadly weapon. The Montana statute regarding the use of deadly
force to prevent the commission of a crime restricts such force to situations involving the commis-
sion of a forcible felony. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3-102 (Spec. Pamphlet 1977).
31. New York and Oregon. See note 28 supra. The New York statute does not include
within its ambit all crimes denominated burglary; only "burglary in the first degree," which essen-
tially is the unlawful entry of a dwelling at night by a person who causes or threatens to cause
serious harm to another, is covered by the statute. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 1975).
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 at 416 (Smith-Hurd 1972). It has been suggested that the
substitution of "forcible felony" for "felony" did not fulfill the drafters' avowed intent and is just
as indefensible. See Note, Policeman's Use ofDeadly Force in Illinois, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 252
(1971).
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the circumstances surrounding that particular act, still could result in
unjustifiable killings.33 Instead, the Model Penal Code permits the use
of deadly force by a police officer only if the fleeing felon himself had
used, or threatened to use, deadly force in. committing the crime, or if
• there is a substantial risk that the fleeing felon will cause. death or seri-
ous bodily injury to another if his apprehension is delayed.34
Nine states35 have thus significantly departed from the common
law rule by adopting versions of the Model Penal Code rule. The Ken-
tucky statute is, in fact, even more restrictive: it is not sufficient that the
fleeing felon may have used deadly force in the commission of the
crime, but it must also be likely that he will again endanger human life
unless immediately apprehended. 36
Clearly, however, there has been no unwavering trend toward the
adoption of the Model Penal Code concept by state legislatures. 37
Within recent years the legislative bodies in at least two states, Mis-
souri38 and Connecticut, 39 have reexamined their respective common-
law-based statutes and have declined to adopt a more restrictive policy
on the use of deadly force. Furthermore, New York, which had previ-
ously enacted a version of the Model Penal Code deadly force rule, has
retreated from that position by now specifically naming those felonies
for commission of which a fleeing suspect may be killed by the police. 40
33. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, Comment 3 at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) for the full text on the
use of force in law enforcement. The relevant portion is (2)(b) which provides as follows:
The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless: (i) the arrest is for a
felony; and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is
assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and (iii)
the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent
persons; and (iv) the actor believes that: (1) the crime for which the arrest is made in-
volved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or (2) there is a
substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily harm if
his apprehension is delayed.
35. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27 (Spec. Pamphlet 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-1-707(2)(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-307(3) (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.8 (West Spec.
Pamphlet 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.090(2) (Baldwin 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17A,
§ 107(2)(B) (Spec. Pamphlet 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412(3) (Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-401(d)(2)(b) (1978); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 9.51(c) (Vernon 1974). Alabama, Col-
orado, and North Carolina additionally allow the use of deadly force to apprehend a person at-
tempting to escape by the use of a deadly weapon.
36. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.090(2)(c) (Baldwin 1975).
37. Idaho, for example, adopted virtually the entire Model Penal Code in 1971 but repealed
it effective April 1, 1972, after it had been in effect for only three months. Included among the
repealed statutes was the Model Penal Code approach to the use of deadly force.
38. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 544.190, 559.040 (Vernon 1969). See also Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d
1007, 1022 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per curiam sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171
(1977).
39. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-a-22(c)(2) (West 1972). See also Jones v. Marshall, 528
F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1975).
40. New York adopted the Model Penal Code approach in 1965 but repealed it in 1967,
replacing it with a statute listing the specific felonies for commission of which deadly force may be
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However, even under the current New York statute,4' the slaying of a
felon fleeing after the commission, or attempted commission, of a bur-
glary is severely restricted to very limited situations42 and would not
have been authorized under the facts of most cases that have consid-
ered the constitutionality of deadly force statutes.
MODERN LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICIES
Although state legislatures have been reluctant to modify their re-
spective deadly force statutes from the common law approach, such
revisions can be found in the evolving policies of many law enforce-
ment agencies. Few courts which have considered the constitutionality
of such statutes have given any indication that they have even consid-
ered these modem policies and recommendations in holding, as did the
Sixth Circuit, that a common-law-based statute is "necessary to ele-
mentary law enforcement. ' '43 Yet, as the authors of a 1977 Police
Foundation" report have observed, "the clear trend across the country
seems to be toward the adoption of police department firearms use pol-
icies, generally narrower than either the statutory or decisional state
law that is applicable. '45
On the federal level, the policy of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion adopted in 1972 is that "an Agent is not to shoot any person ex-
cept, when necessary, in self-defense, that is, when he reasonably
believes that he or another is in danger of death or grievous bodily
harm."46 Similarly, the regulations of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs state that "an agent will not shoot at any person ex-
cept to protect his own life or that of some other person. Agents will
not fire at fleeing suspects or fleeing defendants. .... -47
On the local level, increasing numbers of police departments are
unilaterally adopting policies more restrictive than their state laws. A
used. See Leibowitz, Justifiable Use of Force Under Article 35 of the Penal Law of New York, 18
BUFFALO L. REV. 285 (1969), for a criticism that the New York law on deadly force is now "more
drastically permissive of violence than the common law." [d at 290.
41. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(l)(a) (McKinney 1975).
42. See note 31 supra.
43. Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247, 1252 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822
(1977).
44. "The Police Foundation is a privately funded, independent, non-profit organization es-
tablished by the Ford Foundation in 1970 and dedicated to supporting innovation and improve-
ment in policing." POLICE FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at ii.
45. Id at 45-46.
46. Federal Bureau of Investigation Memorandum 31-72, Nov. 21, 1972, cited in Mattis v.
Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 1015.
47. Internal Regulations, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Dec. 1971, cited in
Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 1016 n.18.
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1974 study reported that police department regulations in a majority of
the large cities of the United States allowed the firing of a weapon by
an officer only when a felon presented a threat of death or serious bod-
ily harm to someone. 48 The 1977 Police Foundation study reported
that police departments in large cities have developed a "tolerant atti-
tude" toward burglars.49 Police department policies in five of the seven
major cities that were the subject of an in-depth analysis by the Police
Foundation forbid the firing of guns at fleeing burglars.50 One ration-
ale for the change in such policies was provided by the Chief of the
Oakland, California, Police Department:
Considering that only 7.65 percent of all adult burglars arrested and
only .28 percent of all juvenile burglars arrested are eventually incar-
cerated, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the use of deadly
force by peace officers to apprehend burglars cannot conceivably be
justified. For adults, the police would have to shoot 100 burglars in
order to have captured the eight who would have gone to prison. For
juveniles, the police would have to shoot 1,000 burglars in order to
have captured the three who would have gone to the Youth Author-
ity.5 '
A few police departments have gone even beyond the Model Penal
Code approach 52 by forbidding the shooting of a fleeing felon solely for
the purpose of apprehension, even if the crime he committed was one
of violence; only if he again threatened serious harm to someone dur-
ing the course of his attempt to escape could the felon be fired upon. 53
The Police Foundation report suggested a policy for police depart-
ments with outmoded, confusing, or unwritten policies which itself goes
somewhat beyond the Model Penal Code rule. 54
However, as the Police Foundation study noted, "[a] common fea-
48. Study by the Planning and Research Division of the Boston Police Department, May 3,
1974, citedin Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 1016 n.19.
49. POLICE FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 49.
50. Id at 50.
51. Charles R. Gain, Discharge of Firearms Policy: Effecting Justice through Administrative
Regulation (unpublished), cited in POLICE FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 46.
52. See note 34 supra.
53. POLIcE FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 50.
54. Id at 131-33. The suggested policy is the following:
An officer may use deadly force: I. To defend himself or herself, or another person, from
what the officer reasonably perceives as an immediate threat of death or serious injury,
when there is no apparent alternative. II. To apprehend an armed and dangerous sub-
ject, when alternative means of apprehension would involve a substantial risk of death or
serious injury, and when the safety of innocent bystanders will not be additionally jeop-
ardized by the officer's actions.
The authors suggest that there should be a supplemental regulation or extension of the basic
policy to include the following elaboration on the basic policy:
The principal factors which could make an armed subject so dangerous as to justify the
use of deadly force under section 1I would be the following: (1) The subject has recently
shot, shot at, killed, or attempted to kill someone, or has done so more than once in the
past; (2) The subject has recently committed a serious assault on a law enforcement of-
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ture of many firearms policies is that they appear to be more restrictive
than they really are."'55 Moreover, although it may be suggested that
the internal adoption of a written policy that essentially embodies the
Model Penal Code rule will solve the problem of the use of deadly
force by the police without court intervention, inconsistent and arbi-
trary enforcement of the policy would defeat such an ideal. Where dis-
ciplining is left solely in the hands of a chief of police who may not
support such a policy, or where no penalties are attached to violations
of the regulations, the adoption of such policies by police depart-
ments, without court interpretation that such policies are constitution-
ally mandated, may be only illusory. 56 Nonetheless, it is significant
that the unilateral adoption of such police department regulations is the
trend and is supported by citizens57 as well as law enforcement offi-
ficer acting in the line of duty; (3) The subject has declared that he will kill, if necessary,
to avoid arrest.
The subject must also be armed and appear to be capable of inflicting death or serious
injury. Obviously, any person armed with a gun fits this description, unless the gun is
known to be inoperable. The dangerousness of a person armed with a knife, axe, or
similar weapon will depend on the feasibility of isolating the subject and on his or her
prOximity to other persons. It should generally be assumed that someone armed with a
esser weapon can be apprehended without "substantial risk of death or serious injury";
thus, deadly force will not be used, ordinarily, against such a person except to defend
against an "immediate threat" as described in section 1.
• . . The use of deadly force is authorized against fleeing suspects if all the conditions
stated above are met and the suspect is so dangerous that any future attempt at appre-
hension is likely to involve a substantial risk of death or serious injury to police or civil-
ians.
55. Id at 48.
56. The situation which existed in the Los Angeles Police Department may serve as an exam-
ple. Although the California statute on the use of deadly force, CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (West
1970), basically consists of the common law rule, the courts of the state have interpreted the stat-
ute's use of the word "felony" to mean a violent felony that threatened the life of another. (See
note 25 supra for cases so interpreting the statute.) Furthermore, while the written policy of the
Los Angeles Police Department until the fall of 1977 allowed officers to use their weapons to
apprehend fleeing felons, it nonetheless suggested that discretion be used and that it was "not
practical . . . [to] state with certainty that the escape of the perpetrators must be prevented at all
costs." POLICE FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 48. Yet, from January, 1975, through mid-1977,
ninety persons had been killed by the Los Angeles police during the commission of, or attempt to
escape from, an alleged crime, with at least one third of those killed unarmed. In These Times,
Nov. 2-8, 1977, at 5, col. 1.
The absurdity of an incident in August, 1977, when a naked man climbing a pole was shot six
times by a police officer who said the man had attacked him, prompted the Police Commission, a
civilian body appointed by the mayor of Los Angeles, to force a reform of police department
procedures. Among the new guidelines was one forbidding a police officer from shooting some-
one committing a crime only against property. Furthermore, a police officer would not be permit-
ted to shoot at a fleeing felon unless he had committed a violent crime and his escape presented a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to others. Id. at 6, col. 3. However, despite these
new guidelines, the police department and its chief at that time, Ed C. Davis, resisted their appli-
cation with some success because the chief alone did all disciplining and no penalties were at-
tached to the guidelines. Id
57. A civilian body, for example, compelled the reform of police department deadly force
procedures in Los Angeles in 1977. See note 56 supra. The numerous incidents of citizens being
killed by Chicago police officers during 1977 led to extensive criticism in the local news media that
included a call for the adoption of essentially the Model Penal Code approach. See, e.g., Chicago
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cials.58 Legislatures and courts can no longer ignore or minimize such
developments.
THE UNSETTLED COURSE OF CASE LAW
Early Rejections of the Constitutional Challenge
Direct court challenges to the constitutionality of deadly force stat-
utes have been rare. Those few attempts to have such statutes declared
invalid have usually been brought in conjunction with actions based on
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 59 as well as under the particular state's wrongful
death act. Plaintiffs have generally claimed that the conduct of police
constituted a violation of equal protection and a denial of due process,
and inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment on the deceased. 60
Courts, however, have been reluctant to accept such arguments, re-
jecting them often rather summarily and without indicating in their
opinions that they have given full consideration to the bases of the con-
stitutional claims being made.
Sun-Times, Oct. 23, 1978, at 45, col. 1; Commentary by Peter Nolan on WMAQ-TV, Chicago
(Oct. 18, 1978).
58. For example,, in the wake of-a number of incidents in 1977 and 1978 in which Chicago
police officers had killed civilians, Cook County State's Attorney Bernard Carey called for a limi-
tation on the use of "fatal force in incidents in which the safety of private citizens or law-enforce-
ment officers is threatened. This standard has long been used by the FBI, thus avoiding many
tragic incidents." Chicago Sun-Times, March 24, 1978, at 8, col. 1. See also Carey's remarks in
Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 24, 1977, at 10, col. 1. In addition, Thomas P. Sullivan, United States
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, called for "a vigorous public discussion" of the
Illinois statute on the use of deadly force (see note 29 supra) in which "the media, the [Illinois]
legislature, and other interested parties [would] consider whether Illinois law should be changed in
light of what force policemen are permitted to use." Chicago Tribune, Oct. 19, 1978, at 6, col. 1.
Without taking a position on the question, Sullivan suggested that elimination of burglary as an
offense justifying the use of deadly force should be considered. Id See also Chicago Sun-Times,
Oct. 18, 1978, at 5, col. 1.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 1983] provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any :State or Territor, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United Statesor other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injuredin an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.60. Such challenges usually have been brought by the parents of the slain person or by an-
other claimant under the state's wrongful death statute. Plaintiffs have been found to have stand-
ing to seek a declaratory judgment that the state's deadly force statute was unconstitutional
because of their vested right to bring suit for the death of their son or other relative under the
state's wrongful death act. See Wolfer v. Thaler, 525 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975
(1976); Smith v. Wickline, 396 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Okla. 1975). But see Jones v. Hildebrant, 550
P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976) (mother cannot bring suit under section 1983 in her own right for the depri-
vation of her son's rights apart from her remedy under the wrongful death cause of action); contra
Phillips v. Ward, 415 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171
(1977), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a parent does not have standing to
seek a declaratory judgment that a state's deadly force statute is unconstitutional when his claim
for damages under section 1983 and the state's wrongful death act has been dismissed.
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The first case in which a federal court definitively ruled on the
validity of a common-law-based deadly force statute was Cunningham
v. Ellington.61 In that case a three-judge district court panel was con-
vened to consider only the facial constitutionality62 of a Tennessee stat-
ute63 codifying the common law rule and permitting police officers to
use "all the necessary means" to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon. The
court rejected the argument that the statute permitted the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to
the United States Constitution64 by simply stating that the statute did
not deal with the type of "punishment" which falls within the scope of
the eighth amendment.65 The district court also rejected plaintiffs con-
tention that the Tennessee statute was so unconstitutionally overbroad
in its authorization of the use of deadly force as to violate such due
process procedural requirements as the rights to trial by jury, to a con-
frontation of witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel. 66 In essence,
the Cunningham court said that this merely restated the contention that
the force used was punishment, so that "any exercise of force by an
officer to effect an arrest for any offense (indeed even a simple arrest
and the consequent deprivation of liberty!) would be a denial of such
rights."' 67 Besides, all the fleeing felon need do was submit to the arrest
and he would enjoy those procedural rights. By so stating, the
61. 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
62. Plaintiffs had brought the claims seeking a declaratory judgment that the Tennessee stat-
ute was both unconstitutional on its face and as it was applied in the instant case as a class action
suit. The three-judge panel held that the suit could not be maintained as a class action because
"membership in the alleged class is neither distinguishable or definable." 323 F. Supp. at 1074.
Plaintiffs claimed that they represented a class consisting of those citizens of Memphis, Tennessee,
who had been subjected to, were presently subject to, or who will be subjected in the future to
application of the statute. Plaintiffs also sought monetary relief under section 1983 and an injunc-
tion against the enforcement and execution of the statute when the life of a police officer or others
was not in danger during the suspect's attempt to flee.
63. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808 (1975) provides:
If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the
officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.
64. See note 12 supra.
65. 323 F. Supp. at 1075. This rather summary response to an argument based on a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment has been accepted by other courts. See Wiley v. Memphis Police
Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007,
1020 n.32 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per curiam sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171
(1977). But see Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643, 650-51 (E.D. Mo. 1975), in which the district
court discussed the, merits of, and then rejected, an argument based on the eighth amendment on
the assumption that use of deadly force by the police in such circumstances can be considered
"punishment" within the meaning of the eighth amendment's use of the term. See also text ac-
companying notes 204-16 infra.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted. . .; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
67. 323 F. Supp. at 1075.
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Cunningham court apparently chose to ignore the critical issue of what
is to be done in the actual cases in which the fleeing felon does not
submit to arrest.
Finally, the plaintiff, relying on Skinner v. Oklahoma,68 claimed
that the Tennessee statute was a denial of equal protection in that it
allowed deadly force to be used against fleeing felons but not against
fleeing misdemeanants. The Cunningham court disagreed, stating that
the real basis for the Skinner decision was that the statute at issue in
that case treated persons who had committed substantially the same
crime differently. Thus, Skinner did not mean that a constitutional
question would be raised merely by a statute's classification of crimes. 69
Therefore, the Cunningham panel held that the Tennessee statute did
not suffer from any of the constitutional defects placed in issue.
The following year the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
Beech v. Melancon,70 upheld a lower court ruling that the defendant
police officers were justified in their use of deadly force in attempting to
apprehend the plaintiff and his slain accomplice under the same Ten-
nessee statute.7' The Sixth Circuit noted the Cunningham court's decla-
ration of the statute's constitutionality but did not itself make any
judgment on the issue. Instead, the court asserted that the police of-
ficers were entitled to assume the constitutionality of the statute, for
state and federal statutes are presumed constitutional until courts de-
clare otherwise. 72
In a concurring opinion, Judge McCree stated what apparently un-
derlies all decisions upholding the use of deadly force by police:
The facts of this case present an example of a situation in which
courts should not second-guess police officers who, faced with mak-
68. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). An Oklahoma statute provided that upon the third conviction for a
felony involving moral turpitude, a person was subject to being rendered sexually sterile (after a
hearing to determine if his health would be harmed by the sterilization). The statute, however,
excluded convictions for embezzlement and certain other felonies. Skinner had been convicted of
stealing chickens twice and convicted of robbery twice; it was determined that he should be steril-
ized. The United States Supreme Court held that the statute violated the equal protection clause.
Although larceny and embezzlement could be substantially the same offense under Oklahoma
law, a person thrice convicted of grand larceny could be sterilized while a person thrice convicted
of embezzlement could not be.
69. 316 U.S. at 540. See discussion of the equal protection argument in text accompanying
notes 188-203 infra.
70. 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). Two men, one of whom
died, were shot by police officers as they tried to escape after attempting to steal a safe from a gas
station. The police officers had identified themselves as such and had warned the men to halt,
but they did not do so. The man who survived filed a civil rights action under section 1983 against
the policemen.
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808 (1975). See note 63 supra for text of statute.
72. See McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Davis Warehouse Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944); Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
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ing split-second decisions, reasonably and in good faith believe that
their lives or those of third persons would be endangered if they re-
frain from employing deadly force to attempt to apprehend fleeing
felons whose arrest cannot reasonably be accomplished by less dan-
gerous means.
73
However, Judge McCree specifically reserved judgment on the consti-
tutionality of the Tennessee statute as applied to a situation in which it
was more obvious than in the instant case that the fleeing felon had
posed no threat of death or serious bodily harm to anyone either during
the commission of the crime or during his attempt to escape.74 The
judge was to repeat this same concern five years later in his concurring
opinion in Wiley v. Memphis Police Department.75
In Jones v. Marshall,76 the next case in which the constitutionality
of a deadly force statute was considered, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit essentially followed the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in
Beech and of the Cunningham court. The father of a sixteen-year-old
boy who was slain by a police officer as the youth fled from an automo-
bile he was suspected of stealing77 brought a section 1983 action against
the policeman. The officer asserted as a defense the Connecticut stat-
ute78 on the exercise of deadly force by the police, which, he claimed,
afforded him a privilege to use such force as long as he had a reason-
able good-faith belief that that force was necessary to apprehend the
fleeing felon.79 The plaintiff, on the other hand, maintained that the
73. 465 F.2d at 426 (McCree, J., concurring).
74. Id
75. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
76. 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
77. Theft of a motor vehicle was defined as a felony by Connecticut law at the time of the
incident. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-57 (West 1972). The West Hartford, Connecticut police officer
had spotted a stolen Cadillac and had followed it. After a high-speed chase, the stolen vehicle
finally stopped and the occupants raced away across an open field. Without firing a warning shot
or attempting any other means of apprehension, the officer fired at one of the fleeing persons and
killed him. It was stipulated at the trial that neither the deceased nor his companions, who were
all about sixteen years old, had been armed or had specifically threatened physical injury in any
manner to the police officer or to any other person. It was further stipulated that the automobile
chase had not endangered any individuals other than the occupants. As the facts indicate, the
dead youth and his two companions were more probably guilty of joyriding, a misdemeanor, than
of auto theft. Neither of the decedent's companions was charged with a felony; the charge against
one was ultimately dropped, and the other boy received a suspended sentence after a guilty plea to
the misdemeanor.
78. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22 (West 1972) provides in pertinent part:
A peace officer. . . is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person...
only when he reasonably believes that such is necessary to: (I) Defend himself or a third
person from the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or (2) effect an arrest or to
prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he reasonably believes has committed
or attempted to commit a felony.
79. An earlier case in the Connecticut state courts had declared that the common law privi-
lege and the use of deadly force under such circumstances to be constitutional. See Martyn v.
Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 198 A.2d 700 (1964).
Police officers have commonly asserted good-faith reliance on the constitutionality of the
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Connecticut statute should not be applied; rather, the court should for-
mulate its own federal law of privilege which, the plaintiff claimed,
should be the Model Penal Code rule80 on the use of deadly force.
Under such a rule, the police officer could assert the statute as a defense
only if he had believed at the time of the killing that the felon had
himself used or threatened to use deadly force in the commission of the
felony or that there was a substantial risk that he would use such force
if not immediately apprehended.81
However, the district court held that since the state rule was consti-
tutional as construed by Connecticut state courts, that was the rule
which should control the case.82 The fact that the Connecticut legisla-
ture had recently reexamined and approved of the common law rule83
was strong evidence to the district court that:
the common law rule is not one which is generally regarded as so
shocking to the conscience as to violate the Constitution. While there
is no doubt that a contrary view exists and indeed has much to support
it, it is not the prerogative of this Court to judge the constitutionality
of state laws on policy grounds alone .... 84
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the plaintiff in Jones again ar-
particular state's deadly force statute as a defense in civil rights actions against them. Courts have
held that federal rather than state law should apply and should determine the adequacy of de-
fenses asserted in section 1983 actions. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1975); Bell v. Wolff, 496 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1974). Yet, although not bound by the state
deadly force statutes, federal courts have generally made the state law the rule to apply to the case.
See, e.g., Quails v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1975).
Occasionally, however, a court has stated that it would not allow such a privilege and defense
if it "were writing on a blank slate." See Quails v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 1976). See
also Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (W.D. Tenn. 1971). The principal reason
enunciated by courts for deferring to state law is that "a decision to the contrary would be unfair
to an officer who relied, in good faith, upon the settled law of his state that relieved him from
liability for the particular acts performed in his official capacity." Quails v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690,
694 (6th Cir. 1976). See also Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.) (McCree, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975);
Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974); Note, Police Officer Who Shoots Fleeing Felon
Protected From 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Action by State Privilege Rule, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1294
(1976).
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). See note 34 supra.
81. Id
82. The Supreme Court has stated that section 1983 "should be read against the background
of tort liability," Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), and has found that a defense which is
part of that background is also a defense under section 1983, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555
(1967). This led in part to the Jones district court's rejection of the request to formulate a new
federal privilege.
83. See note 79 supra. Such recent reevaluation and approval of the common law rule by the
legislature was also to be emphasized in the dissenting opinion of Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d
1007, 1021 (8th Cir. 1976) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting), vacatedas mootper curiam sub nom. Ashcroft
v. Mattis, 431 .U.S. 171 (1977).
84. 383 F. Supp. 358, 362 (D. Conn. 1974) (emphasis added).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
gued that the Model Penal Code rule should be adopted as the federal
rule in a section 1983 action in lieu of the state statute. He also con-
tended that the state statute lacked logical support, was historically out-
moded, had been uniformly disapproved by legal scholars,85 and, most
damaging of all, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The plaintiff argued that, "procedurally speaking, [the
statute] permits the arbitrary imposition of death by the officer, violates
the presumption of innocence, and denies the suspect a right to trial by
jury."86 However, the Second Circuit summarily dismissed such argu-
ments as being of little value in trying to replace the common law con-
cept with the Model Penal Code rule. Each argument, said the court,
could apply equally to the provisions of the Model Penal Code, which
the plaintiff claimed were constitutional. 87 Specifically, in accordance
with the Model Penal Code, a policeman could use deadly force in at-
tempting to arrest a fleeing felon who had used deadly force himself in
the commission of the crime. Yet, according to the Second Circuit,
such a killing would be equally arbitrary and just as surely would de-
prive the fleeing felon of his life without affording him procedural due
process as would a policeman's use of deadly force under the common
law or under the Connecticut deadly force statute.88 The court de-
clared that the plaintiff, by urging the application of a rule as arguably
violative of due process as the one he claimed was unconstitutional,
had thereby conceded his arguments based on a denial of procedural
due process.89 Such cavalier treatment of the plaintiffs due process
claims neglects the fact that arguably the Model Penal Code provisions
are indeed constitutional, being nonarbitrary and protective of due
process concerns.
Finally, in the winter of 1976-77, the two most recent cases in
which the constitutionality of a state's deadly force statute was deter-
mined resulted in a direct clash of the circuit courts of appeals. In Mat-
tis v. Schnarr,90 the Eighth Circuit became the first court to hold that a
state's deadly force statute codifying the common law rule was uncon-
85. See also Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 1011-12 n.7.
86. Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d at 136 n.9. These arguments were to form the basis of much
of the Mattis court's reasoning that the Missouri statutes indeed do violate due process.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. See Note, Police Officer Who Shoals Fleeing Felon Protectedfrom 42 U.S. C § 1983 Action
by State Privilege Rule, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1294 (1976), in which the author concludes that the
Jones court, by failing to adequately distinguish between the question of privilege and that of
immunity from liability for the police officer, ignored the real issue of the constitutionality of the
statute and instead complicated the law governing suits arising under section 1983.
90. 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per curiam sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis,
431 U.S. 171 (1977).
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stitutional. Two months later, however, the Sixth Circuit, in Wiley v.
Memphis Police Department,9' specifically rejected the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning in upholding the validity of a similar statute.
Mattis v. Schnarr
In Mattis, the father of an eighteen-year-old boy who had been
shot in the head and killed by a policeman when the boy fled after
burglarizing an unoccupied office 92 brought a civil rights action against
two police officers. He alleged that the officers had deprived his son of
his life without due process of law, had deprived him of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, and had inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment
on him.93 Furthermore, the plaintiff asked the court to declare uncon-
stitutional the two Missouri statutes94 authorizing a police officer's use
of deadly force in arresting a fleeing felon.95
The district court held96 that the defenses of good faith and proba-
ble cause were available to the policemen, for they had acted in reli-
ance upon the constitutionality of the Missouri statutes. The court,
therefore, dismissed the action, concluding that no justiciable issue was
present which permitted declaratory relief.97 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,98 holding that while the trial
court's finding was correct in regard to dismissing the action for dam-
91. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
92. Eighteen-year-old Michael Mattis and his seventeen-year-old companion entered the of-
fice of a golf driving range at night through an unlocked window. The youths were discovered in
the office by a police officer. They attempted to escape through the back window and, ignoring the
policeman's order to stop, ran off as the officer fired a shot at them. Another officer arrived on the
scene and caught Mattis, but the boy broke away. The officer shouted to Mattis to stop or he
would shoot, but the youth did not halt. The police officer fired one shot at Mattis, which struck
the boy in the head and killed him. Both officers believed that firing their guns at the youths was
reasonably necessary to prevent their escape and to effect their arrest, and that such use of their
weapons was authorized by valid Missouri statutes.
93. The action was brought under both section 1983 and the Missouri Wrongful Death Act,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon 1969), and it claimed violations of the eighth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
94. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.040 (Vernon 1969) provides in pertinent part:
Homicide shall be deemed justifiable when committed by any person in either of the
following cases: . . . (3) When necessarily committed in attempting by lawful ways and
means to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully. . . keeping or
preserving the peace.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.190 (Vernon 1969) states:
If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendent. he either flee or forcibly resist, the
officer may use all necessary means to effect the arrest.
95. The plaintiff, who asked for nominal damages of $100, was assisted in his representation
by the American Civil Liberties Union. The dissenters in the first Mattis appeal to the Eighth
Circuit cited the ACLU's involvement as a prime reason why the Attorney General of Missouri
should be allowed to intervene on the defendant police officers' behalf on remand.
96. Mattis v. Kissling, Civil No. 72-Civ. (3) (E.D. Mo., filed Jan. 16, 1973).
97. The district court also reversed its original decision that the father had standing to bring
the action under section 1983 when it denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
98. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974).
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ages, good faith and probable cause were not available as defenses to
the action insofar as declaratory relief was concerned, and that declara-
tory relief is not dependent upon a showing that the plaintiff is entitled
to monetary relief.99 The court of appeals remanded the case to the
district court solely to determine whether the Missouri statutes in ques-
tion should be declared unconstitutional.
The plaintiff made no claim that the statutes were unconstitutional
insofar as they allowed police officers to use deadly force where reason-
ably necessary in order to arrest a fleeing felon who had used, or had
threatened to use, deadly force in the commission of the crime; nor
were the statutes challenged as to their permitting deadly force to be
used to apprehend a fleeing felon whom the officers believed would
seriously harm them or others if he were not immediately appre-
hended.' °° Rather, the claim was that the statutes were unconstitu-
tional insofar as they authorized the use of deadly force against fleeing
persons believed to have committed, or to have attempted to commit, a
nonviolent felony' 0' when the police officers have no reasonable belief
that the fleeing felon will use deadly force against them or another citi-
zen.
With this single issue before it, the district court rejected the plain-
tiff's arguments based on due process, equal protection, and cruel and
99. The Eighth Circuit also held that Michael Mattis' father did indeed have standing under
section 1983. However, the fact that the denial of damages by the district court was unchallenged
by the plaintiff on appeal formed the basis for the United States Supreme Court's refusal to con-
sider the merits of the Eighth Circuit's finding that the Missouri statutes were unconstitutional.
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (per curiam). The Supreme Court stated that the suit did
not present a live case or controversy; there was no longer any possible basis for a damage claim,
for the issue had been decided by the district court and had gone unchallenged on appeal. In
regard to the request for a declaratory judgment on the statutes' constitutionality, the Court stated
that there must be "a dispute which 'calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis,
but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts.' Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ha-
worth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937)." 431 U.S. at 172. The Court declared that no "present right" of
the plaintiff was at stake, for the only question left to be decided was whether the police officers
would have been liable f the defense of good faith had not been available to them. Thus, the
judgment of the Eighth Circuit was vacated with instructions to the district court to dismiss the
only remaining complaint, the request for the declaratory judgment.
A year later, however, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed what it termed the "jurisdictional hold-
ing" of Mattis in a case in which it reversed the district court and remanded for a new trial a civil
rights action in which damages were sought by the mother of a man shot to death by Omaha,
Nebraska police officers as he fled from the scene of a burglary. "The right to life is fundamental
and is protected against unreasonable or unlawful takings by the procedural due process safe-
guards of the fifth and fourteenth amendments." Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1325 (8th
Cir.), ceri. denied, 99 S. Ct. 282 (1978).
100. Thus, the provisions of the Model Penal Code regarding the use of deadly force by the
police were implicitly regarded as constitutional by the plaintiff. See note 34 supra.
101. "Nonviolent felony" here includes all felonies except homicide, forcible rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault-the Federal Bureau of Investigation classifications. See Mattis v.
Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 10 11 n.6.
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unusual punishment grounds and found the statutes constitutionally
valid.10 2 The court held that the statutes did not violate the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause because the father's claim-that his
parental right to raise a family continues unless and until terminated by
due process of law-must yield in a balancing test to the overriding
interest of the state in assisting policemen in fulfilling their duty to ap-
prehend criminals and protect society, as had been determined by the
state legislature. 103 The court stated that perfect statutes are impossible
to draft. 04 Nonetheless, it is the legislature's duty, not the judiciary's,
to choose among the various imperfect alternatives. Since the Missouri
statutes' classification as to whom the police can direct deadly force
against was as reasonable and as free of arbitrariness as any other pro-
posed alternative, the court found no equal protection violation. 0 5 Fi-
nally, because the use of deadly force authorized by the statutes did not
offend any fundamental principle of justice or exceed the boundaries of
civilized conduct, 0 6 the district court held that the statutes did not vio-
late the eighth amendment. 0 7
Disagreeing, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared
the Missouri statutes unconstitutional. 108 Its decision was based prima-
rily on a combination of substantive due process and changing public
policy considerations. The Eighth Circuit focused its decision on what
it termed the fundamental right to life of an individual, which right is
protected by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. 09
However, the Eighth Circuit recognized that there are some situa-
tions in which the state's interest is so compelling that the state may
take life without affording the individual the full protection of due
process. 11o Those situations are to be determined by balancing the in-
102. 404 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
103. Id at 647.
104. Id. at 650.
105. Id at 649-50. Thus, the district court essentially echoed the reasoning of the Second
Circuit in Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975), in which it rejected the plaintiffs due
process argument. See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
106. 404 F. Supp. at 650.
107. Id.
108. 547 F.2d at 1017.
109. Id The Eighth Circuit cited the following cases in support of its belief that the right to
life is indeed fundamental: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 123 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
110. 547 F.2d at 1018. The court specifically referred to the 1976 United States Supreme
Court decisions upholding the constitutionality of certain state "death penalty" statutes: Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976).
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terest of society in guaranteeing a person's right to life against the inter-
est of society in insuring the public safety. In contrast to the district
court, however, which stated that it is so/ely the prerogative of the legis-
lature to determine how that balance should be struck,''' the Eighth
Circuit asserted that it is the judiciary which has the ultimate responsi-
bility of determining whether the balance struck is constitutional.' 12
Because a fundamental right was at issue, the state had the burden of
demonstrating that an interest existed which at least was equivalent to
the right to life in order to justify the use of deadly force against fleeing
felons who have neither used nor threatened to use deadly force against
another. But, the court stated, no such demonstration had been made.
Rather, the Missouri statutes created "a conclusive presumption that all
fleeing felons pose a danger to the bodily security of the arresting of-
ficers and of the general public,"' 13 a presumption which was obviously
incorrect as applied to the facts of the Mattis case and which, according
to the court, had never been factually demonstrated to be true.
The Eighth Circuit noted that "[flelonies are infinite in their com-
plexity, ranging from the violent to the victimless,"' 14 and that police-
men cannot be constitutionally vested with the authority to kill every
fleeing felon without regard to the specific crime committed. The court
cautioned that police officers must be required to use reasonable and
enlightened professional judgment while always remaining aware that
"death is the ultimate weapon of last resort, to be employed only in
situations presenting the gravest threat to either the officer or the public
at large."'' 15
In addition, the Eighth Circuit considered the historical founda-
tion for the common law rule," 6 the statutes of other jurisdictions and
the Model Penal Code,' '7 and scholarly opinion over the last fifty
years." 8 It examined at length the recommendations of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice" 19 and
of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.' 20
It discussed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's policy on the use of
firearms' 2' as well as the policies of a number of other law enforcement
Il1. 404 F. Supp. at 651.
112. 547 F.2d at 1019.
113. Id
114. Id at 1020.
115. Id.
116. Id at 1011 n.7.
117. Id at 1012-13.
118. Id at 1011 n.7, 1014-16.
119. Id at 1014.
120. Id at 1013 n.13.
121. Id at 1015-16.
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agencies.' 22 After considering all such information, the Eighth Circuit
concluded:
[T]he historical basis for permitting the use of deadly force by law en-
forcement officers against nonviolent fleeing felons has been substan-
tially eroded, that federal and many state and local law enforcement
agencies prohibit the use of deadly force against such felons except
where human life is threatened, and that the policy of permitting
deadly force to be used against all fleeing felons contributes little or
nothing to public safety or the deterrence of crime.' 23
Finally, the court delineated a statute which, in its opinion, would
be constitutional: the use of deadly force by law enforcement officers in
the apprehension of fleeing felons should be limited to situations:
where the officer has a warrant or probable cause to arrest the felon
where the felon could not be otherwise apprehended and where the
felon had used deadly force in the commission of the felony, or the
officer reasonably believed the felon would use deadly force against
the officer or others if not immediately apprehended. 24
The dissenting opinion in Mattis, concurred in by three of the
seven judges, emphasized that it is the function of the legislature, not
the judiciary, to modify state statutes rooted in common law which in-
volve questions of public policy. 125 It chided the majority for showing
no interest in the contrary opinions of other courts and pointed out that
there exists no other instance in which the common law rule on the use
of deadly force, either codified or uncodified, has been invalidated by a
court, either state or federal. 26 The dissent noted that the majority was
suggesting a modified version of the Model Penal Code as a constitu-
tional statute, while ignoring the fact that the Model Penal Code as a
whole was a proposal for legislative, not judicial, modification of the
common law. Furthermore, only one year earlier the Missouri legisla-
ture had rejected any amendment to the state's criminal code based on
the Model Penal Code. 127
Wiley v. Memphis Police Department
Soon after the Mattis decision was rendered, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adhered to the reasoning of the
122. Id at 1016 nn.18-19.
123. Id at 1016. See also text accompanying notes 39-54 supra.
124. id at 1020 (emphasis added). This is stricter than the Model Penal Code rule which
allows the use of deadly force if the fleeing felon had only threatened to use deadly force himself
against his victim, even if he did not actually use it. See note 34 supra.
125. Id at 1021-22 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id at 1022. However, California state courts have construed that state's deadly force
statute, a codification of the common law rule, in a manner equivalent to the suggested constitu-
tional rule of the Matis majority. See note 25 supra.
127. Id
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courts in Cunningham v. Ellington 28 and Beech v. Melancon12 9 by af-
firming a district court's holding that the Tennessee statute 30 on the
use of deadly force was constitutional.' 3' In Wiley P. Memphis Police
Departmen' 32 the mother of a sixteen-year-old boy slain by police of-
ficers 133 initiated a civil rights and wrongful death action and sought a
declaratory judgment that the Tennessee statute was unconstitu-
tional.' 34 The district court, however, relied on Cunninglam, which
had upheld the statute's constitutionality. The court found that the of-
ficers were justified in relying on the statute and in employing "the only
practicable means available to them under . . . circumstances requir-
ing split second judgment to prevent the deliberate attempt to escape of
one caught in the midst of a felonious burglary."' 35
In affirming the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit also de-
ferred to the Cunningham reasoning in rejecting the plaintiff's claims
that the police officers had deprived her son of due process and had
inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment on him.136 The Sixth Circuit
harshly criticized the Eighth Circuit's Mattis decision.137 It chided the
128. 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
129. 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
130. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808 (1975). See note 63 supra for text of this statute.
13 1. The Tennessee statute is essentially identical to the Missouri laws at issue in Mattis. Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 544.190, 559.040 (Vernon 1969). See note 94 supra for text of these statutes.
132. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
133. Three Memphis policemen spotted three black youths inside a sporting goods store at
night. Two of the boys raced from the store into a large ditch nearby. Although the officers
repeatedly warned them to stop, the youths kept running. Two of the policemen fired their guns.
Plaintiffs son was critically wounded and later died. The second youth later surrendered at police
headquarters, and the third was captured when he was found hiding inside the sporting goods
store. Shotguns taken from the store were subsequently found in the ditch in which plaintiffs son
was killed.
134. 1d at 1248-49. The cause of action was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985,
1986, 1988, and under the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution. Id at 1248.
135. Id at 1250 (quoting the district court's memorandum opinion).
136. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra. An equal protection challenge was also made
in Wiley upon the basis of a disproportionate use of deadly force against non-white suspects. That
argument was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, in part because, based on Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), a racially disproportionate impact is not sufficient to overturn a state statute
without proof of a racially discriminatory purpose. Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d at
1254. See also Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 1014 n.15, for some statistical information on the
shootings of non-white suspects by the police.
137. The Wiley court was so eager to point out what it considered errors in the Mattis majority
opinion that it neglected to be wary of making errors of its own. The Sixth Circuit, in referring to
the Mattis majority, asserted: "It even erroneously stated 528 F.2d 141 n.21 that the Court in
Wolfer v. Thaler had held that the parents did not have standing to sue despite the statement in
Wolfer. . .that the parents did have standing." 548 F.2d at 1252. Unfortunately, that statement
by the Wiley court was itself erroneous. The citation given is not to the Mattis opinion but to
Jones v. Marshall, and neither the Jones decision nor the Mattis decision includes that erroneous
statement. The Eighth Circuit, in fact, reported the Wolfer holding correctly in its Mattis opinion,
547 F.2d at 1017 n.21.
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Eighth Circuit for rejecting Cunningham, Beech, Jones v. Marshall,1 38
and the decision of the Wiley district court, and for "embarking on a
new course which should have been left to the state legislatures where it
belongs."' 3 9 It denounced the Eighth Circuit for ignoring the "fact"
that such deadly force statutes are "necessary even to elementary law
enforcement." 140
One significant difference in the facts of Mattis and Wiley may
well make the cases distinguishable. In Wiley, the youth who was slain
was fleeing from a sporting goods store in which guns and ammunition
were available, not from a comparatively innocuous golf driving range
office as in Mattis. The Memphis police officers had a basis for reason-
ably believing their lives might be endangered by the fleeing youth.
Evidence at the trial indicated that stolen weapons were actually found
near the body of the boy who was killed. Judge McCree, who had
withheld judgment on the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute in
Beech v. Melancon,14' also wrote a separate concurring opinion in
Wiley in which he emphasized that his decision was based solely on the
fact that the officers could reasonably believe that the fleeing felon
presented an apparent threat to human life and that the case did not
require the court to decide the validity of the Tennessee statute.'4 2
THE VITALITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK
The foregoing cases illustrate the major arguments advanced in
challenging the constitutional validity of common-law-based deadly
force statutes. Other than in the Mattis decision, the courts have re-
sponded by rejecting such arguments. However, the cursory treatment
often given such constitutional claims, especially in light of the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Mattis, does not weaken the theory that a major
constitutional assault can still be made on such statutes and can suc-
ceed.
A Task for the Courts, Not Just the Legislatures
The first obstacle to be overcome is the courts' deference to the
138. 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
139. 548 F.2d at 1252.
140. Id In doing so, however, the Sixth Circuit overlooked the fact that a great number of law
enforcement agencies and departments throughout the country reject such a use of deadly force
and do not find it "necessary." See also text accompanying notes 43-54 supra and Mattis v.
Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 1013-16.
141. 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). See text accompanying
note 74 supra.
142. 548 F.2d at 1256 (McCree, J., concurring).
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legislatures as the governmental bodies charged with the task of creat-
ing and modifying deadly force statutes. In ruling on the constitution-
ality of the various laws, courts have indicated that if they "were
writing on a blank slate,"'' 43 they would limit the privilege of police
officers to use deadly force to those situations condoned by the Model
Penal Code's proposed rule, namely, instances in which the felon
caused or threatened the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a citizen,
or in which there was a substantial risk that the fleeing felon would
cause or threaten such serious harm if his apprehension were delayed. 44
When a federal district court 45 in Memphis suggested that the Tennes-
see legislature should reexamine the policy behind its common-law-
based statute because "as a matter of value judgment it [may well] be
better to allow persons thought to be felons to escape than to incur the
risk of killing them,"'' 46 that court was merely repeating the admonition
given the Tennessee legislature by the Tennessee Supreme Court nearly
one hundred years earlier. 147 However, despite such apparent beliefs
by courts that the common law rule is wrong, and despite the lethargic
reaction or outright hostility of many state legislatures to any change in
that rule, courts generally have declared that they will not themselves
"legislate" in this regard. 148
Nonetheless, the reality is that courts have indeed been legislating
in this area. Quite often a state's statute permitting the use of deadly
force against a fleeing criminal makes no distinction between fleeing
felons and fleeing misdemeanants. 149 Yet courts throughout the coun-
try have invariably construed such statutes, which appear on their face
to refer to all criminals, as being applicable to felons only, thus follow-
ing the common law rule.' 50 Such a major restriction on a law may
indeed be termed "legislating," yet courts have exhibited little reluc-
tance to do S0.15I As the plaintiff argued in his appeal to the Eighth
143. Quails v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 1976).
144. Id.; Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975); Beech v. Melancon, 465 F.2d 425 (6th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
145. Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
146. Id at 1075.
147. Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879). See note 26 supra.
148. See, e.g., Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d at 1247. The Wiley majority stated:
"We agree with the dissent in the Eighth Circuit case (Mattr v. Schnarr), which was highly critical
of the majority opinion for not following the decisions of other Circuits and for embarking on a
new course which should have been left to the state legislatures where it belongs." Id. at 1252.
149. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808 (1975) and Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 544.190, 559.040
(Vernon 1969). See notes 63 and 94 supra for the text of the statutes.
150. See, e.g., Manson v. Wabash R.R., 338 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1960); People v. Klein, 305 Ill.
141, 137 N.E. 145 (1922); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879).
15 1. Indeed, the willingness of courts to make such a modification of the law may be due to
the existence of a model in the common law. Nevertheless, such a modification can certainly be
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Circuit in Mattis:
[w]hen a court, for the purpose of removing some ancient barbarity,
modifies the common law, reads a statute to mean other than what it
says, imposes considerations of public policy, or strikes down a stat-
ute under one of the seminal provisions of the Constitution, the result
is all the same, and these are all time-honored practices of American
courts. 1
52
The Sixth Circuit in Wiley was highly critical of the Eighth Circuit
"for embarking on a new course which should have been left to the
state legislatures where it belongs."' 53 But the Eighth Circuit in Mattis
realized that it is not an adequate response to a question concerning the
validity of the killing of a nonviolent, nonthreatening fleeing felon
merely to say that it is a judgment for the legislature. Rather, the
Eighth Circuit recognized that those state legislatures which refuse to
modify or even consider a change in their common-law-based deadly
force statutes are ignoring the fact that there must be "changing con-
cepts as to minimum standards of fairness" 54 and decency and human-
ity in the field of criminal justice, and that courts are required to
re-evaluate those standards. 155 Indeed, in light of the evolving policies
of many federal and local law enforcement agencies, 56 the overwhelm-
ing opinion of legal scholars that the common law rule is no longer
valid, 57 the increasing concern of the general public, 58 as well as the
fact that many state legislatures have already adopted the Model Penal
Code rule or have greatly restricted the common law use of deadly
force,' 59 those states that still adhere to the common law rule are igrior-
ing the changed perceptions of standards of decency in the criminal
field. As the Mattis court indicated, the judiciary cannot abdicate its
called "legislating," for the state legislatures, when enacting such statutes, had the option of ex-
plicitly delineating the common law felon-rmisdemeanant distinction.
152. Appellant's Brief at 13, Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot
per curiam sub noma. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
153. 548 F.2d at 1252.
154. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), cited in
United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1965).
155. See, e.g., Justice Frankfurter's opinion on the necessity of evolving standards of funda-
mental fairness in determining the meaning and scope of the due process clause in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-71 (1952); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466-
67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
156. See text accompanying notes 43-54 supra.
157. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1011-12 n.7 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per
curiam sub noma. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
158. See notes 56-57 supra. Also, as the superintendent of the Chicago Police Department,
James O'Grady, stated, citizens are constantly concerned with the use of deadly force by police
officers, thereby demanding continuous review of their policies by responsible police officials. In-
terview of James O'Grady on WMAQ-TV, Chicago (Apr. 20, 1978).
159. See notes 27-36 supra and accompanying text.
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function of ensuring that the individual is accorded that fair, decent,
and humane treatment that is his constitutional right 60 by deferring to
an unresponsive legislature.
The Due Process Argument
With that obstacle hurdled, a court considering the constitutional-
ity of a common law form of deadly force statute may find possible
bases for striking down such a law in the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment as well as in the eighth and
fourth amendments. The Mattis court, in resting its decision on a com-
bination of substantive and procedural due process arguments, indi-
cated the best initial approach. Courts admittedly hesitate to base a
decision regarding a constitutional question on the somewhat disfa-
vored doctrine of substantive due process.' 6' The Eighth Circuit in
Mattis certainly avoided use of such terminology and throughout its
opinion mingled elements of procedural due process in discussing the
deprivation of a fleeing felon's right to trial. 162 Yet, unlike other courts
which have evaluated deadly force statutes, the Mattis court recognized
160. See text accompanying notes 163-65 infra.
161. The doctrine of substantive due process, once favored as the means of scrutinizing state
economic regulations (e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)), has been generally discred-
ited since the 1930's for its alleged encroachment on legislative powers. However, the doctrine has
been resurrected in recent years to strike down laws infringing on the individual's personal auton-
omy, primarily in the areas of marital and sexual privacy. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring); 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring); 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J.,
concurring). See also Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Zablocki v. Redhail, 334 U.S. 374,
391 (1978), in which he rejected the majority's use of an equal protection analysis to strike down a
Wisconsin law. That law prohibited any state resident who had minor children not in his custody
but whom he was under a legal obligation to support from marrying without a court approval
order. Such approval would be granted only upon a showing that the support obligation had been
met and that children covered by the support order were not then nor were likely thereafter to
become public charges. Justice Stewart instead- favored a substantive due process analysis to
achieve the same result. He stated that the statute was invalid because it encroached upon a
liberty interest protected by the due process clause, i.e., the right to marry. He stated that while:
[tihe Court is understandably reluctant to rely on substantive due process. .. , [t]o con-
ceal this appropriate inquiry invites mechanical or thoughtless application of misfocused
doctrine. To bring it into the open forces a healthy and responsible recognition of the
nature and purpose of the extreme power we wield when, in invalidating a state law in
the name of the Constitution, we invalidate pro tanio the process of representative de-
mocracy in one of the sovereign States of the Union.
Id at 395-96.
In addition, see Appellant's Brief at 10, Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976),
vacated as moot per curiam sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977):
If this means that we now have substantive due process with respect to certain personal
rights, then so be it. Since the abortion case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. . . (1973) it
can no longer be seriously denied that there is such a thing as substantive due process,
even though some of the justices still shy away from so describing it ...
162. For an argument that common-law-based deadly force statutes can be invalidated on
procedural due process grounds, see Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 21, at 385-88.
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that the main issue is the deprivation of another fundamental right-the
right to life. Courts have seldom dealt with this first of the trilogy of
rights safeguarded by the due process clauses, 163 and indeed it may be
argued that the United States Supreme Court has not directly and ex-
plicitly held that the right to life is "fundamental." 164 Nonetheless, the
Court has sufficiently supported the doctrine and referred to a "funda-
mental" right to life165 often enough so that it is not reckless to claim
that life is indeed a fundamental right.
If that proposition is accepted, then the state has the burden of
proving the existence of a compelling governmental interest in order to
sustain legislation which infringes on that fundamental right to life.
Furthermore, the state has the additional burden of proving both that
the legislation is a necessary means to achieve that state interest and
that it is the least restrictive method of all possible alternatives. 166 As
expressed in Roe v. Wade,' 67 the state must prove that the legislative
enactment has been "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake."' 68
In applying such a test, there are several possible governmental
interests that must be weighed against the fleeing felon's right to life.
The first of these, of course, is the protection of the general public. If
the fleeing felon has caused or threatened serious bodily harm to a per-
son in the commission of his crime, or if there is a substantial risk that
he will do so in his attempt to flee from the police, then, as the Model
Penal Code provisions acknowledge, the rights of the citizens or police
officers may indeed supersede the suspect's right to life.169 But there is
163. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
[Nior shall any person. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I provides in pertinent part:
[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.
164. Rights explicitly termed "fundamental" by the Supreme Court have been the right to
vote, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the fight to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and
the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
165. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) ("the fundamental human rights of life and
liberty"). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973): Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
123 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring); 325 U.S. at 134-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
166. Although this test of "strict scrutiny" of a state law is generally applied by a court when
considering whether the law violates the equal protection clause, the test is also applicable in cases
involving fundamental rights protected by the due process clause. See, e.g., Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
167. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
168. Id at 155.
169. It may be argued, however, that there is no compelling state interest in killing the suspect
even if he himself has already killed someone unless there is also a substantial likelihood that he
will kill again in an attempt to escape. The Kentucky deadly force statute apparently reflects such
reasoning. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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no such compelling state interest when the fleeing felon had neither
used nor threatened to use serious violence against another either in the
commission of the crime or during his attempted escape. Nor can it be
said that protection of property is a state interest which can supersede a
person's fundamental right to life. It also cannot be argued that the
state has an overriding interest in preventing future crimes from being
committed by this fleeing felon, for it is but mere speculation that the
suspect will commit future crimes---or, more accurately, future crimes
involving serious personal violence. Indeed, both the common law and
most state statutes forbid the use of deadly force in attempting to stop a
person from committing a crime, 70 particularly one involving property
only.
Similarly, an argument can be made that the state's overriding in-
terest is one of deterrence, either to deter felons in general from com-
mitting crimes or to deter those who do commit a crime from fleeing
arrest through the fear that deadly force will be employed. However,
as Justice Marshall has noted in his opinions in Supreme Court cases
considering the validity of some capital punishment statutes,' 71 there
are no decisive conclusions that can be drawn regarding the value of
the death penalty as a deterrent to committing crime. It may thus be
inferred that inflicting the penalty of death on a fleeing felon would
similarly be of doubtful utility as a deterrent to future felons. Indeed,
what statistical evidence is available indicates little, if any, connection
between statutes forbidding the use of deadly force in situations not
involving serious violence and an increase in crime. 72 Furthermore,
there can be no compelling state interest in using deadly force to deter
felons from fleeing arrest. 173 The inherently speculative nature of such
an asserted interest cannot make it compelling. Indeed, experiences of
various police departments with the use of warning shots prior to
shooting at a fleeing suspect indicate that the threat of police using
deadly force has little, if any, effect on deterring the flight of suspects
from arrest. 174
170. See text accompanying notes 180-84 infra.
171. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 233-36 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 347-54 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
172. See Tsimbinos, supra note 21, at 19-20.
173. Some courts have erroneously referred to similar arguments against deadly force statutes
as arguments for a right to flee. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643, 650 (E.D. Mo. 1975);
Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
174. The use of warning shots as an aid in the apprehension of fleeing suspects and as a
precondition to the use of deadly force was abandoned by the Memphis, Tennessee, Police De-
partment in 1969 because analysis of the situation in Memphis and other cities showed that warn-
ing shots have no effect on fleeing suspects and may in fact cause some to flee all the faster. The
risk of injuring innocent bystanders was too great to continue such an ineffective policy, thus
resulting in a ban on the use of warning shots. See Brief for Appellant at 58, Wiley v. Memphis
Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1977).
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However, even if it were assumed that the state's interest in the
deterrence of flight by felons through fear of death can be compelling,
the killing of fleeing felons is not a necessary means of achieving that
objective-it is not the method of attaining that end which least bur-
dens the felon's fundamental right to life. Rather than killing fleeing
suspects in order to deter others from fleeing from arrest, the act of
fleeing from apprehension could instead have a serious criminal pen-
alty attached to it. The state legislature could create a separate crime of
attempted evasion of arrest whereby a felon who fled could be charged
with and convicted of this additional crime and subjected to another
penal sentence besides that imposed for the original crime. Instead of
allowing police officers to kill fleeing suspects in order to deter hypo-
thetical others from such flight, state legislatures should make such pro-
visions for the fair and orderly prosecution of one who fled from
apprehension. 75  Such an additional penalty would not be any more
unlikely than the use of deadly force to achieve the presumed state's
interest of deterrence of suspects' flight from arrest.' 76 A similar sug-
gestion was offered by a Louisiana federal district court in Sauls v.
Hutto:177 "Nor is the need to deter resistance to arrest a sufficient
justification for the use of deadly force. If this be society's concern,
then resisting arrest itself should be made a serious felony."' 78
It thus cannot be maintained that the state has a compelling inter-
est in killing every felon, of every stripe, who flees from arrest. Neither
the protection of the general public nor the deterrence of others from
crime or from fleeing arrest can override the fleeing nonviolent felon's
fundamental right to life. Instead, the real interest of the state in regard
to a fleeing suspect consists of apprehending him alive, bringing him to
175. Professor Mikell's oft-quoted questions suggest this same conclusion:
It has been said, "Why should not this man be shot down, the man who is running
away with an automobile? Why not kill him if you cannot arrest him?" We answer:
because, assuming that the man is making no resistance to the officer, he does not de-
serve death * * * May I ask what we are killing him for when he steals an automobile
and runs off with it? Are we killing him for stealing the automobile? If we catch him
and try him, we throw every protection around him. We say he cannot be tried until 12
men of the grand jury indict him, and then he cannot be convicted until 12 men of the
petit jury have proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and then when we have
done all that, what do we do to him? Put him before a policeman and have a policeman
shoot him? Of course not. We give him three years in a penitentiary. It cannot be then
that we allow the officer to kill him because he stole the automobile, because the statute
Frovided only three years in a penitentiary for that. . . .Is it for fleeing that we kill him?
leeing from arrest is also a common law offense and is punishable by a light penalty, a
penalty much less than that for stealing the automobile. If we are not killing him for
stealing the automobile and are not killing him for fleeing, what are we killing him for?
9 ALl Proceedings 186-87 (1931), quoted in Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1014-15 (8th Cir.
1976), vacated as moot per curiam sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
176. See Appellant's Brief at 19, Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976).
177. 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969). See text accompanying note 182 infra.
178. Id at 132 n.24.
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trial, and formally punishing him if he is convicted according to fair
and just procedures.
Even if the foregoing proposition that the right to life is funda-
mental is rejected, a mere rationality test leads to the identical conclu-
sion that common-law-based deadly force statutes cannot be sustained.
There can be no conceivable rational basis for the existence of a statute
permitting the use of deadly force to apprehend all fleeing felons. Such
deadly force statutes are merely codifications of the common law
rule 179 and the common law distinguished between the use of deadly
force in order toprevent the commission of a crime and its use in order
to apprehend one who has already committed a crime. The use of
deadly force to prevent the commission of a felony was justified only
for felonies which involved force or violence, or the threat of such force
or violence, which was directed against a person. Thus, deadly force
could be used to prevent crimes against a person such as murder and
robbery, but not impersonal crimes such as burglary or larceny. 80
The common law, therefore, embraced an irrational distinction be-
tween the situations in which deadly force could be employed. Its use
was permissible toprevent the commission of only those felonies which
involved serious danger to a person while, on the other hand, its use
was permissible to apprehend all fleeing persons who had committed
any type of felony. This irrational distinction has been preserved in
many states.' 8' It cannot, however, serve as a reasonable basis for the
codification and the continued vitality of the common law rule on the
use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing felons. This was noted again
by the Louisiana district court in Sauls v. Hutto 182 in which it held that
the mother of a teenaged boy who was killed by police as he fled from
the scene of a crashed automobile he had stolen, was entitled to recover
damages from the officer in a wrongful death action. The court found
that Louisiana statutes did not allow deadly force to be used to prevent
the commission of a felony involving only property. 83 Thus, the court
concluded: "Since it is illegal for one to use deadly force toprevent the
commission of a felony involving only property, it is unreasonable (and
179. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
180. See Note, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L. REV. 566,
577 (1961); Tsimbinos, supra note 21, at 8.
181. E.g., Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-507(1), 41-510(2)(a) (1977)); Connecticut (CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-19(a), 53a-22(c)(2) (West 1972)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 776.012,
776.05 (West 1976)); and New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 627:4(11), 627:5(II)(b)(1)
(1974)).
182. 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969).
183. The court characterized this as a marked departure from the common law rule. However,
sources listed by the court indicate it was only a classification of the common law. Id at 130. See
note 180 supra.
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inappropriate) for a policeman to use deadly force to arrest a man sus-
pected of committing such a crime."'' 84
Another irrational distinction perpetrated by the common law and
continued today in most state law codifications is that between shooting
fleeing felons and shooting fleeing misdemeanants. 85 As noted previ-
ously, the common law rule that served as a basis for the distinction has
outlived its rationale. Thus, the danger posed by a criminal to the pub-
lic is not determined by a classification of crimes that is based on the
maximum sentence one can receive for the crime or the place of incar-
ceration. 186 Even Chief Justice Burger, who is generally regarded as
being quite concerned with and mindful of the needs of the police in
enforcing law and order, has indicated awareness of the irrationality of
such a distinction:
Freeing either a tiger or a mouse in a schoolroom is an illegal
act, but no rational person would suggest that these two acts should
be punished in the same way. From time to time judges have occa-
sion to pass on regulations governing police procedures. I wonder
what would be the judicial response to a police order authorizing
"shoot to kill" with respect to every fugitive. It is easy to predict our
collective wrath and outrage. We, in common with all rational
minds, would say that the police response must relate to the gravity
and need; that a "shoot" order might conceivably be tolerable to pre-
vent the escape of a convicted killer but surely not a car thief, a pick-
pocket or a shoplifter.' 8 7
Since it is firmly entrenched in the case and statutory law of most
states that there is no rational justification for the use of deadly force to
prevent the commission of a felony not involving serious force or vio-
lence as well as there being no justification for the killing of fleeing
misdemeanants, there can be no rational basis for the use of deadly
force to apprehend all fleeing felons. Thus, no matter what test is ap-
plied, the due process clause demands that deadly force statutes al-
lowing the killing of all fleeing felons, whether or not they have used or
have threatened to use deadly force themselves, be found unconstitu-
tional.
184. Id
185. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
186. Such is the modem basis of the distinction between a misdemeanor and a felony. Most
states define a misdemeanor as a crime punishable by no more than one year's incarceration in the
county jail, while' a felony is punishable by more than one year's imprisonment in a state peniten-
tiary.
187. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 419
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The Equal Protection Argument
An analysis of the safeguards afforded by the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause leads to a similar conclusion. The foun-
dation of an argument relying on the equal protection clause is the
different standard of treatment given fleeing felons in relation to fleeing
misdemeanants.188 The challenge is not to a state's right to classify
crimes as felonies or misdemeanors as such; rather, it is a challenge to
the use of such a classification as a basis for determining who may law-
fully be shot to death by the police. '8 9
The two-tier analysis traditionally employed by courts in the equal
protection area results in an analysis substantially similar to that
presented above in regard to substantive due process arguments. If a
law results in a suspect classification' 90 or deprives some persons of a
fundamental right or interest,' 9 ' then the standard of review is one of
"strict scrutiny" whereby the state, in order to justify the challenged
classification, has the burden of proving that the classification furthers
a compelling governmental interest and that it is both necessary to and
the least restrictive means of attaining that end.192 On the other hand,
if no suspect classification or fundamental interest is involved, a statu-
tory classification will be upheld as long as there is some mere "rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose."' 193 No matter what test is
applied, however, common-law-based deadly force statutes should be
invalidated.
188. The "classes" involved for equal protection analysis are those persons against whom
deadly force may be used and those against whom it may not. In most states, the two classes are
fleeing felons and fleeing misdemeanants. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
189. This basis for an equal protection attack has been misinterpreted by two courts: Mattis v.
Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D.
Tenn. 1971).
190. Classifications held suspect are those based on alienage (at least in regard to state legisla-
tion), Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and
nationality,- Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
191. See note 164 supra.
192. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)- Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
193. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972). See also Marshall v.
United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). A third test
seems to have emerged from recent Supreme Court cases. This medium strength test requires that
the statutory classification actually advance legitimate articulated state goals. See Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); McGinniss v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Deadly force
statutes also should be invalidated under this test. Shooting fleeing felons but not fleeing misde-
meanants cannot rationally further any of the proposed legitimate state ends. See text accompa-
nying notes 197-201 infra.
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Because the use of deadly force deprives a person of his funda-
mental right to life, equal protection analysis requires that the statutory
policy be subjected to "strict scrutiny." As indicated in the discussion
of the substantive due process argument, 194 there is no "compelling"
state interest which can support such a policy. None of the asserted
governmental interests-the protection of the lives and property of the
general public as well as the deterrence of others from committing
crimes or from fleeing arrest-can override the fleeing felon's funda-
mental right to life. 195 Furthermore, none are sufficient to "satisfy the
[state's] heavy burden of justification, and [to] insure that the State, in
pursuing its asserted objectives, has chosen means that do not unneces-
sarily burden constitutionally protected interests." 196
However, even if the more deferential standard of equal protection
analysis applicable when fundamental rights are not at stake is em-
ployed, there still can be found no minimum rational relationship be-
tween a common-law-based deadly force policy and a legitimate state
purpose. As discussed in regard to substantive due process analysis, 97
possible goals of the state that such a use of deadly force arguably can
achieve include the protection of the public from harm, the prevention
of the particular perpetrator from committing future crimes, deterrence
of others from committing crimes, and the deterrence of those who do
commit crimes from fleeing arrest. However, to the extent they are le-
gitimate, these interests are not served by a policy which fails to operate
so as to rationally advance the asserted purposes. 98 Protection of the
general public is not rationally furthered by a statute authorizing the
killing of fleeing felons but not fleeing misdemeanants. Rather, only
classifications based on the distinction between those who caused or
threatened serious bodily harm to a person, or who pose a substantial
risk of so doing in an attempt to flee, and those who have not caused or
threatened such serious personal injury can serve the purported state
goal. As to the goal of preventing a fleeing suspect from committing
future crimes, a legislature might find that felony suspects are more
likely to commit crimes in the future than misdemeanor suspects. It is
doubtful that any state legislature has made such a determination
before codifying the common law rule, and thus such a policy is based
on mere speculation that hardly can justify taking a person's life. Fur-
thermore, it is unlikely that such a finding can ever be made according
194. See text accompanying notes 161-78 supra.
195. See text accompanying notes 166-74 supra.
196. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974).
197. See text accompanying notes 169-74 supra.
198. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973).
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to a general felon-misdemeanant distinction for it has been determined,
for example, that murderers are seldom recidivists. 99 Thus, if the
state's goal is to prevent a fleeing suspect from committing future
crimes, it would be rational to exclude murderers from the category of
those who can lawfully be shot to death. Yet, if any criminals have
rationally forfeited their right to life, it could be argued, murderers
have done so. Furthermore, it would only be rational to kill fleeing
felons if it were found that the future crimes which they are more likely
to commit than misdemeanants involve serious violence to persons.
What rational basis can support a determination that it is justifiable to
kill a fleeing burglar because a fleeing burglar is more likely to commit
future burglaries than a fleeing petty thief2°° is likely to commit future
petty thefts? Thus, the proposition that a rational relationship exists
between the felon-misdemeanant classification in deadly force statutes
and the purported goal of preventing future crimes is untenable.
In regard to the asserted state interest in deterring others from
committing crimes and deterring those who do commit crimes from
fleeing apprehension,20 the felon-misdemeanant classification can only
be justified if killing fleeing felons will increase the deterrence of crime
and flight from apprehension more than killing fleeing misdemeanants
will. However, it appears more reasonable to conclude that the con-
verse would be true: killing fleeing misdemeanants would likely have a
greater deterrent effect because there would be more killing with more
widespread publicity of the likely fate of fleeing criminals of every
stripe, leading to the installation of increased fear in all potential
criminals. Yet it is beyond imagination that at this point in history any
legislature or law enforcement agency would approve the policy of kill-
ing anyone suspected of committing a minor infraction who flees ap-
prehension. Thus, there again appears to be no rational basis for the
purported state goals.
It has been suggested that, although an equal protection argument
has merit, it misses the essential point: "The real objection to the use of
deadly force against nonviolent felony suspects is not that such laws
discriminate between nonviolent felony suspects and misdemeanants,
but that nonviolent suspects are shot at all."' 20 2 Furthermore, the argu-
199. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643, 649 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Appellant's Brief at 55,
Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976).
200. Burglary is generally classified as a felony while theft of items of minor value is classified
as a misdemeanor.
201. See text accompanying notes 171-74 supra.
202. Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 21, at 379. The Eighth Circuit agreed with this view-
point in perfunctorily dismissing an equal protection argument while striking down the Missouri
deadly force statutes on due process grounds. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir.
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ment goes, a victory in declaring a common-law-based deadly force
statute unconstitutional which is founded on the equal protection argu-
ment would be "at the expense of intellectual honesty and doctrinal
clarity. ' 20 3 Indeed it may be more "intellectually honest" to attack
deadly force statutes on substantive due process grounds. Yet if a court
is more intellectually comfortable with a meritorious argument
presented in a traditional equal protection framework, concerns of
"doctrinal clarity" should not inhibit it from declaring the unconstitu-
tionality of a law that permits the slaying of nonviolent felony sus-
pects, whether "truly" members of a class or not. The equal protection
clause, therefore, is a viable basis for invalidating common-law-based
deadly force statutes.
The Eighth Amendment Argument
An argument based on the eighth amendment's proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment has been advanced in several cases 2°4 to
prove such statutes' unconstitutionality, but the court in each case has
rejected the argument. Although the proposition has considerable at-
tractiveness, its treatment by the courts makes its usefulness as a vehicle
to invalidate deadly force statutes extremely doubtful.
One formidable barrier is the question of whether the use of
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing nonviolent felon falls within the
ambit of the word "punishment" in the eighth amendment. 20 5 The his-
tory and judicial application of the amendment indicate that the use of
deadly force against fleeing suspects does constitute punishment. The
debates surrounding the adoption of the United States Constitution
demonstrate that the cruel and unusual punishment clause was in-
tended to apply not only to post-conviction penalties but also to pretrial
treatment of suspects.2 0 6 Courts have thus held the proscriptions of the
eighth amendment applicable to pretrial treatment of those arrested
and detained as well as to pretrial conditions of confinement, even
though such treatment is not intended as "punishment" in the post-
1976). See also Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391
(1978), quotedin note 161 supra.
203. Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 21, at 380.
204. Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep'i, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822
(1977); Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976); Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.
Mo. 1975); Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
205. U.S. CONST. amend. ViII states:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted.
206. See 3 J. ELLtOT's DEBATES 447-52 (2d ed. 1876), quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 259-62 & nn.2&3 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 320-21 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
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conviction sense of the word.20 7 Furthermore, the fact that most deadly
force statutes are merely codifications of the common law rule indicates
that the use of deadly force is "punishment." Since most felonies at
common law were punishable by death, the use of deadly force was
justified as merely accelerating in time the penalty the criminal had
already incurred by his conduct.2°8 Thus, "punishment" was a princi-
pal purpose of the common law rule. The Supreme Court has stated
that "[i]f the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punish-
ment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoers, to deter others, etc., it has
been considered penal. ' 20 9 It therefore appears that the use of deadly
force is punishment within the contemplation of the eighth amend-
ment.
Nevertheless, no court has been willing to so hold. The district
court in Cunningham v. Ellington210 was apparently the first court to be
confronted with the contention that a common-law-based deadly force
statute violates the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unu-
sual punishment. The Cunningham court cavalierly dismissed the argu-
ment: "[T]he short answer to plaintiffs' contention is that we simply are
not dealing with punishment."' 21 ' Courts confronted with subsequent
challenges based on the cruel and unusual punishment clause generally
have merely cited the Cunningham court's holding. 212 The unwilling-
ness of even the Eighth Circuit in Mattis v. Schnarr to consider the use
of deadly force as "punishment" does not bode well for the viability of
this argument. 21
3
207. See Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974); Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir.
1972); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States ex tel. von Wolfendorf v. Johnston, 327 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889).
208. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
209. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
210. 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
211. 1d at 1075.
212. The Sixth Circuit in Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977), implicitly adopted the Cunningham court's holding when it quoted
the opinion of the Wiley district court, which had relied entirely on Cunningham. Id. at 1251. The
district court in Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mo. 1975), took note of the holding in
Cunningham; it then held alternatively that, even assuming that use of deadly force is to be con-
sidered punishment, an eighth amendment attack must fail because the fact that so many states
authorize the use of deadly force against all fleeing felons "surely give[s] credence to the proposi-
tion that the limits of civilized standards have not been exceeded." Id at 65 1. The Eighth Circuit
in Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), while finding the Missouri deadly force stat-
utes unconstitutional, did not decide on eighth amendment grounds, although it was expressly
presented with that contention. It noted that a good argument could be made for a decision based
on the eighth amendment but then further noted that other courts "have held that an officer's use
of deadly force to arrest is not punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment as the
arresting officer has no power to punish and may be violating the law if he seeks to do so." Id at
1020 n.32.
213. The thread common to all decisions in which the cruel and unusual punishment clause
has been held applicable is the detention and confinement of the person "punished." Courts gen-
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If a court were to find that the use of deadly force constitutes pun-
ishment, then standards of eighth amendment review enunciated by the
Supreme Court in its 1972 death penalty case, Furman v. Georgia,214
and its 1976 death penalty cases215 may be applicable to the use of
deadly force. Factors which led to the invalidation of the death penalty
laws challenged in Furman include the danger of the arbitrary and
standardless imposition of the death penalty, the severity of a penalty
which is so extreme as to degrade man's dignity, the disproportionate
harshness of the penalty in relation to any legitimate need asserted to
justify it, and cruelty which violates evolving standards of decency.
The 1976 cases emphasize that a penalty cannot be imposed without
focusing on the individual defendant and the nature of the particular
crime. Such standards provide the basis for valid arguments against
the constitutionality of the use of deadly force against nonviolent
felons,2 16 once a court admits that such use is "punishment."
The Fourth Amendment Argument
Finally, an argument can be made that the fourth amendment's
proscription of unreasonable seizures 217 mandates that common-law-
based deadly force statutes be held unconstitutional. Apparently only
the district court and the Sixth Circuit in Wiley v. Memphis Police
Department have been confronted with such an argument. 218  The
Wiley district court dismissed the fourth amendment claim as meritless
because the plaintiff had been unable to cite any federal cases which
had construed the amendment to apply to the use of deadly force by
the police to effect the arrest of nonviolent felony suspects.219 Al-
erally have had no conceptual difficulty with declaring that treatment of confined individuals who
are awaiting trial and have not been convicted of any crime should be governed by the protections
of the eighth amendment at least as much as the treatment of those actually convicted. See, e.g.,
Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). It requires a much greater conceptual
leap to state that treatment of a person not yet in the custody of the state is punishment. Courts
might prefer to leave such situations under the protection of the due process clause or the fourth
amendment.
214. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
215. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
216. See Brief for Appellant at 77-79, Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 21, at 382-83.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . ...
218. The Eighth Circuit, in Mattis v. Schnarr, noted that it "has also been suggested that stat-
utes of this type can be held violative of the Fourth Amendment" but stated that it would not
consider the approach since it was not considered in the district court and was not advanced on
appeal. 547 F.2d at 1020 n.32.
219. Brief for Appellant at 68, Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
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though the contention was again argued on appeal, the Sixth Circuit
refrained from mentioning the fourth amendment claim in affirming
the district court's upholding of the validity of the Tennessee statute.
However, an argument may be made that the use of deadly force
to apprehend fleeing suspects certainly implicates the fourth amend-
ment because any form of physical arrest is a "seizure" within the
amendment's ambit.220 Since the fourth amendment requires all
seizures to be reasonable, 22' the use of deadly force against nonviolent
suspects can be upheld only if the practice is reasonable not only in
regard to the general method chosen for making seizures 222 but also in
regard to the manner in which the specific seizure was made.223 Thus,
it may be argued that when deadly force is applied against a fleeing
felon who caused or threatened no serious harm to anyone in the com-
mission of the crime or during his attempt to escape, the manner of
"seizure"-killing him-is grossly unreasonable. It is the "most intru-
sive and destructive possible method or manner of making a seizure of
a person. ' 224 It is therefore possible that common-law-based deadly
force statutes may be held unconstitutional as violative of the fourth
amendment.
CONCLUSION
At common law a police officer was authorized to use deadly force
in order to effect the arrest of any fleeing felon, even if his crime was
nonviolent and he posed no threat of serious harm to anyone. This rule
is still essentially followed in most jurisdictions even though its ration-
ale no longer has relevance and has been widely rejected by legal schol-
ars and law enforcement agencies and commissions throughout the
country.
Nevertheless, thus far the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in Mattis v. Schnarr, is the only court to have held such a common-law-
based deadly force statute unconstitutional, and that decision was va-
cated by the United States Supreme Court on other grounds. Courts
have been reluctant to strike down such statutes because they believe
the task is more properly that of the state legislatures. However, courts
220. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
222. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
223. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
771 (1966); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963).
224. Brief for Appellant at 73, Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
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cannot abdicate their duty of ensuring that individuals are not deprived
of their constitutional rights. The Eighth Circuit recognized its duty
and, clothing its decision in primarily substantive due process garb,
held that such statutes violate a fleeing felon's fundamental right to life.
Either the substantive due process analysis used by the Eighth Cir-
cuit or an equal protection analysis provides the most viable basis from
which other courts can declare the unconstitutionality of common-law-
based deadly force statutes. Arguments grounded in the fourth and
eighth amendments also are potential bases for such a holding. As sug-
gested by the Eighth Circuit, the adoption of the Model Penal Code
approach, whereby police may use deadly force solely against a fleeing
felon who himself has used or threatened to use deadly force against
another during the commission of the crime or his attempt to escape, is
the only rational and civilized response to the problem.
KAREN A. POPEK
